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Abstract 
In the great drama that was mai-juin 1968, the police were unquestionably a central 
actor. In particular, they played a pivotal role in transforming what started out as a 
relatively minor, student-based rebellion into a nationwide movement that brought 
the Gaullist regime to the brink of collapse. The 2016 Nuit Debout protest movement 
drew strong comparisons to the 1968 events with many wondering if France stood to 
experience a repeat of those heady days. This article will argue that the inability of 
Nuit Debout to capture the imagination of the general public in a similar fashion to 
what happened in 1968 is not solely the result of the exceptional and divergent 
contexts. Instead, it will contend that this failure is also to be understood through an 
appreciation of shifting perspectives on France’s anti-police. Such positive 
developments, it will be argued, have ironically been shaped as a result of the 1968 
events and the manner with which they are most commonly remembered.  
 
La police était un acteur indéniablement principal dans les événements de mai-juin 
1968 en France. En particulier, ils ont joué un rôle critique dans la transformation 
d’une crise étudiante, relativement mineur, en un mouvement national qui a poussée 
le régime gaulliste jusqu’au bord du gouffre. Le mouvement Nuit Debout de 2016 a 
été très souvent comparé aux événements de 1968 avec beaucoup qui se 
demandaient si la France risquait une répétition de cette crise phare. Cet article 
avancera l’argument que l’incapacité de Nuit Debout à captiver l’imagination de la 
population générale de la même façon que mai-juin 68 n’est pas simplement la 
conséquence des contextes divergents et exceptionnels des deux mouvements. En 
fait, un tel échec s’explique aussi à travers une appréciation des attitudes 
2 
 
changeantes en ce qui concerne la perspective anti-flic en France. De tels 
développements sont une conséquence inattendue des événements de ’68 et la 
manière dont ils sont le plus communément souvenus.  
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From mai-juin ’68 to Nuit Debout: 
Shifting perspectives on France’s anti-police 
 
Introduction 
The most common assessment of the role played by the forces of order during the 
French events of May-June 1968 is one that posits their performance as yet another in 
a long line of episodes that have contributed to the creation and consolidation of 
what is considered to be a very poor reputation amongst public opinion (Le Goff 
2008, 103-4). To a certain extent, it is difficult to argue with such an assessment. The 
very prominent and much criticised role of the French police during the riots and 
demonstrations of 1968 certainly did little to improve the already sullied reputation 
of this institution. Their very heavy-handed and often violent approach only served 
to confirm pre-conceived ideas. As will be argued later, this was certainly very true 
at the time and, in many respects, such an ‘anti-police’ sentiment, so evidently 
present amongst protestors and the general public, played a hugely significant role 
in helping the spread of the movement from student rebellion to nationwide revolt. 
However, with the 50th anniversary offering a longer-term view, this article seeks to 
present an argument to the contrary. That is, instead of presenting 1968 as yet 
further consolidating the anti-flic sentiment so evident at the time, it will be argued 
that the events of mai 68 can in fact be considered as a pivotally positive moment in 
helping the French forces of order improve their performance and thus their 
reputation amongst the French population.  
After outlining how and why the forces of order came to play such a crucial 
role during the events and how any understanding of what happened is predicated 
on taking stock of their contribution, the article then examines the Nuit Debout 
protest of 2016 to compare how attitudes towards the police have changed. In order 
to explain the very different reactions to police heavy-handedness between 1968 and 
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2016, the article then outlines some of the huge contextual differences at play. It will 
be argued that these are an important, yet insufficient consideration and that there 
are other interesting issues at play in relation to how the reputation of the police has 
evolved over the years. The 1968 events, it will be argued, have been an important 
part of a rehabilitation process.   
 
The pivotal role of the police in 1968 
In the great drama that is the events of May-June 1968 in France, there are a number 
of key protagonists to bear in mind. Any account of what happened some 50 years 
ago would be incomplete without mention of the complete cast including: the 
politicians (normally de Gaulle, Pompidou, Mendes-France, Mitterrand and 
Waldeck-Rochet); the students (dominated by the usual suspects Cohn-Bendit, 
Sauvageot and Geismar); the workers (whose involvement is predominantly 
represented via the actions of the two major trade unions of the time, the  
Confédération générale du travail (CGT) and the Confédération francaise démocratique du 
travail (CFDT)); and finally the forces of order (stereotypically represented by the 
haunting images of the Companies Républicianes de Sécurité (CRS)). Each of these 
groups of actors played important roles that must be understood to help make sense 
of these seismic events. The focus here, of course, is on the role played by the police. 
It is first of all necessary to be clear about what we mean by the term ‘police’ 
in France, and specifically in 1968. Then, this term related to a number of different 
bodies whose mission was to ensure peace and order in France. With a long and 
complicated history, the forces of order in France require a more complex definition 
than simply a single united force (Berlière and Lévy 2013, 35-87; Monjardet and 
Ocqueteau 2004). Perhaps the most straightforward manner with which to 
comprehend the structure is to separate la Gendarmerie Nationale from La Police 
Nationale. The former, part of the military, was charged with ensuring law and order 
in provincial France. The latter, taking orders from the Ministre de l’intérieur, took 
responsibility for large cities.1 Given the focus of trouble in 1968 in large cities, and 
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in the first instances (but not limited to) Paris, it is without surprise that it was la 
Police Nationale that would be the focus during the events, and in particular one 
specific branch – the CRS. Set up in 1944, this body, due to its heavy-handed 
approach to disturbances prior to 1968, had acquired a reputation as a no-nonsense, 
violent and repressive riot unit.  
The dominant narrative of the 1968 events as a small, suburban campus revolt 
quickly spreading to become a nationwide upheaval that brought the country to a 
standstill is firmly anchored the national collective memory of this period (Reynolds 
2011). Making sense of just how and why France was paralysed in this manner is a 
complex and well-trodden area of debate (cf. for example, Singer 1970; Martelli 1988; 
Tarnero 1998; Weber 2008; Fillioud 2016). It is obvious that the social, political and 
economic context provided the grounds for such an exceptional revolt. However, 
beyond the context, one must also take stock of what actually happened. What 
decisions were – and were not – made? Who did what? How did certain actions feed 
into or exacerbate the tensions that (with hindsight) so evidently lay beneath the 
veneer of stability? Central to this understanding is a consideration of the reaction of 
the state and, in particular, President Charles de Gaulle and Prime Minister Georges 
Pompidou. The underestimation and/or deliberate choice to refuse any credence to 
the early stages of the movement saw both Prime Minister and President largely 
absent. The vacuum they left behind was inadequately filled by the ministers 
charged with overseeing operations in their absence. Instead, the state’s reaction was 
perceived to pass through the police. Right from the outset and until the very end of 
the revolt, the forces of order were front and centre. When one considers the key 
moments (3 May, 10 May, 24 May, 10 June, etc.), the key protagonists were not 
politicians but instead the protestors and the police (Mathieu 2013, 152-166).  
This presence was an unquestionably key element in fanning the flames of 
discontent and largely responsible for ensuring the nationwide/ society-wide spread 
of the revolt (Reynolds 2011, 47-8). This can be explained by two interrelated factors. 
Firstly, that the state’s response seemed to be so focussed on repression and not 
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discussion only served to validate the demands of the protestors. The ’68 events can, 
in large part, be understood as the expression of a desire amongst the population to 
have a greater say in how their lives were managed. Sending in the police 
transmitted a clear message that such a request would not be tolerated and only 
served to encourage more people to become involved. Secondly, almost 
immediately, the police response was represented by the CRS and their heavy-
handed tactics. The sight of this riot unit (with its accompanying reputation) 
charging down students did not sit comfortably with the general population and 
guaranteed their sympathy and support (Seidman, 94-7). Furthermore, the rumour 
mill was very much in action with stories of death, rape and severe brutality further 
exacerbating the revulsion amongst protestors and their increasing number of 
sympathisers (UNEF/ SNE Sup 1968). Discussions over the veracity of such rumours 
are immaterial. The fact that the government response to the demands of protestors 
in 1968 was perceived as being no more than brutal repression at the hands of the CRS 
is one of the most significant reasons behind the wildfire propagation of the 1968 
events. 
The 1968 protests were not about police oppression per se but in fact 
something much broader. Nevertheless, the anti-police sentiment was a catalyst in 
exposing a deep-seated social malaise and thus crucial to helping understand what 
happened and why. The next section fast-forwards to the recent Nuit Debout protest 
and, in particular, examines the inability of this movement (so often compared to 
1968) to tap into similar anti-police sentiments in order to spread its message and 
success.  
 
Nuit Debout 
De toute part, des inconnues se parlent, les langues se délient. On discute politique, 
société, vision du monde; on se critique, on s’engueule, on se met d’accord, on 
s’organise (Ngo and Truong 2016, 12). 
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[…] un rejet des formes classiques d’engagement politique et syndical et du désir 
d’expérimenter de nouvelles formes d’action et d’organisation […] (Kokoreff 2016, 
163). 
The above descriptions could well be mistakenly understood as referring to the 
events of May-June 1968. They are in fact reflections on a more contemporary 
moment of protest in France known as Nuit Debout. On 31 March 2016, after a long 
period of tension in opposition to la Loi Travail,2 a group of protestors decided that, 
contrary to normal practice, they would not disperse following the conclusion of 
their demonstration and meeting (Ngo and Truong, 19-23). This was not a 
spontaneous move but one that had been carefully planned in the preceding weeks 
by a nucleus of activists involved with the satirical journal Fakir3 (Brustier, 2018, 28-
29). They had made the decision that following the conclusion of the 31 March 
action, they would not go home but instead stay up all night and occupy the (hugely 
symbolic) Place de la République (Farbiaz 2016, 16-17). So was born Nuit Debout. Over 
the course of the next three months, the movement grew. An initial agreement 
enabling the movement to occupy the place for three days was transformed into a 
more difficult arrangement that allowed the demonstrators the right to occupy the 
square as long as it was cleared by midnight every evening. And so, every day, the 
movement reconstructed its encampment in order to enable its commissions to work 
and general assemblies to take place. As the days passed, the numbers swelled, Nuit 
Debout became ever-sophisticated and started to spread to other cities. At its peak, 
the movement saw the participation of thousands of people, had a prolific output of 
(online, TV and radio) material and a genuine sense of momentum (Nuit Debout 
2016, 42).4 However, by the time the summer of 2016 arrived, the movement had run 
out of steam. Its supporters would still argue that the movement is by no means at 
an end, but there is a feeling that the highpoint has come and gone (Nuit Debout, 31-
32).5 
 Such a sense of disappointment is reminiscent of a similar feeling following 
the events of 1968. However, this is not the only reason for the strong crossover 
between the two movements so evident in the above quotations. In fact, throughout 
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Nuit Debout, the shadow of mai 68 loomed large and when one looks closely it is not 
difficult to see why. Just as had been the case in 1968, there was a strong presence of 
young people, many of whom were students (Kokoreff 2016, 157). However, the 
events of 1968 were not (contrary to popular myth) just about students but, instead, 
should be understood as a movement triggered by young people that would 
eventually see widespread participation from across French society. Whilst there is 
some merit in the notion of Nuit Debout, inverting the trajectory of mai 68, as a youth 
response to a wider strike movement, the same level of diversity that saw 
participation from all walks of life was a common feature of both (Ngo and Truong, 
30-33; Kokoreff, 163-64; Farbiaz, 18-19). A survey carried out by a team of social 
science researchers between 8 April and 13 May 2016 revealed how on categories 
such as age, education, sex and geography, ‘Nuit Debout est un rassemblement plus 
diversifié qu’on ne le dit’ (Collectif, 2016). Another similarity between 2016 and 1968 
relates to the objectives of both movements – or lack thereof. Trying to pin down a 
realistic sense of what the 1968 movement was hoping to achieve is an almost 
pointless endeavour, such was the extent of changes demanded (Reynolds 2011, 41-
2). In fact, one is best understanding ’68 as the expression of a broad sense of ras-le-
bol. It would appear, on the surface, that Nuit Debout was focussed on a single issue – 
la Loi Travail. However, this was simply not the case. La Loi El Khomri sparked a more 
general expression of frustration that extended way beyond an attempt to liberalise 
the world of work in France (Nuit Debout, 46-7; Farbiaz, 11-14; Brustier, 26-38).  
Les Nuit-deboutistes sont donc l’expression d’une révolte sociale, générationnelle, 
politique et idéologique contre le monde qu’on leur promet, celui de l’ubérisation de la 
société, de la marchandisation des corps et des esprits, du capitalisme du désastre et de 
la destruction. (Farbiaz, 28) 
 
 Just as was the case back in 1968, Nuit Debout, offered everyone (even those on the 
margins) the opportunity to demand change where they felt it necessary (Cukier and 
Gallo 2016, 118-37; Kokoreff, 157): ‘La force de ce mouvement, c’est peut-être de donner de 
la légitimité à des paroles qui a priori n’en avaient aucune.’ (Ngo and Truong, 32).  
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The convergence with 1968 was equally in evidence in how the movement 
carried itself. What could be more “68” than the absence of designated leaders and 
the emphasis on horizontal, organisational structures (Kokoreff, 164; Gerard and 
Simonpoli 2016, 15-20)?6 In terms of forms of action and organisation, what could be 
more “68” than the occupation of symbolic spaces so that people could endlessly 
debate and talk (Gerard and Simonpoli, 11-15)? La parole was as at the core of Nuit 
Debout as it was in 1968. Everything was set up to allow discussion to flow – and it 
did – revealing the same underpinning desire to participate and have a say that is so 
fundamental to understanding what happened during the May events (Zéhenne 
2016, 145-47; Gerard and Simonpoli, 8-11; Nuit Debout, 25). The vocabulary, the tone 
and even some of the slogans and material were straight out of 1968. This was 
particularly evident in some of the posters and graffiti that inevitably sprung up as 
the movement took hold.7 It is also interesting to note that Nuit Debout seemed to be 
tapping into the international zeitgeist of protest that had seen the emergence of 
movements such as Occupy or Los Indignados (Guichoux 2016, 30-60; Farbiaz, 27; 
Nuit Debout, 25; Brustier, 1821; 97-101). Here too, it is difficult not see parallels with 
les années 68 when a wave of international protest seemingly swept the globe and 
with what happened in France in 1968 only really understandable via an 
appreciation of this specific international context. One could also point to interesting 
convergences regarding the make-up of some the principal protagonists. For 
example, Nuit Debout, like the 1968 movement, saw the involvement of the full 
spectrum of the political Left, including the extremes, with all the obvious (and 
similar) complications and tensions (Cukier and Lassere, 130-31; Gerard and 
Simonpoli, 20). Equally, the place of Trade Unions within a movement that emerged 
beyond their own structures certainly reminds one of the predicament of bodies 
such as the CFDT of the CGT back in 1968 (Kokoreff, 166-67). Importantly, one can 
also identify a certain degree of similarity between the commonly-held perception of 
the forces of order and their political allegiances back in 1968 and the dominance of 
support for Right/ extreme Right movements amongst the modern-day ranks of the 
10 
 
police.8 Furthermore, as well as the parallels outlined above, 1968 was directly 
present as participants, commentators and the media frequently referred back to mai 
68, in many cases asking whether or not France stood on the brink of a repeat of 
those heady days (Ngo and Truong, 125-28; Farbiaz, 25-26; Brustier, 90-91).  
Parmi les références importantes (Los Indignados, Occupy Wall Street, place Tahrir) 
qui flottent dans les esprits et sur la place, il y a aussi celle de Mai 68, fort de son 
imaginaire générationnelle et politique. On a dit tout et son contraire à ce sujet 
(Kokoreff, 162). 
 
Whilst Nuit Debout is by no means the first movement since 1968 to ask such a 
question or draw such comparisons, the very strong parallels outlined above, 
certainly explain why, on this occasion, such a tendency was more pronounced than 
is normally the case. Finally, and connectedly, just as soixantehuitards had attempted 
to locate their movement at the time to a longer tradition of revolt, one cannot help 
but observe a similar desire by Nuitdeboutists to tap into the same tradition of 
revolutionary spirit (via references to 1968) in order to add some credibility to their 
own struggle (Villechenon 2016). 
Despite these undoubted similarities, and even a certain desire on the part of 
some participants to resurrect the spirit of mai 68, Nuit Debout quite simply failed to 
capture the attention and imagination in anything like the way the 1968 events did. 
The movement was extremely rich and was unquestionably significant for those 
involved but the fact that it failed to trigger a broader movement will have been a 
source of great disappointment for those who believed that it was the beginning of 
something much more important. It is argued here that this failure is in part a result 
of changing public attitudes to the police. However, before exploring that aspect 
more closely and how it fits with the way in which the collective memory of 1968 has 
been constructed, it would be remiss not to set out some other fundamental 
differences in terms of context between 1960s France and that of 2016. 
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Context 
Understanding how the May events seemingly struck like a bolt from the blue 
necessitates a look at the very specific context of mid-to-late 1960s France (cf. for 
example, Brown 1974; Tarnero 1998; Sirinelli 2008). What we see is the convergence 
of a number of exceptional circumstances that paved the way for an equally 
exceptional set of events. France was enjoying the peak of les trente glorieuses; the 
economy was growing like never before (or again for that matter) as the consumer 
society kicked in and the spectre of unemployment was, by modern standards, 
extremely low. France was, for the first time in a long time in a very good place.9 
Economic strength met political stability as de Gaulle’s 5th Republic bedded in, the 
country was finally at peace with the Algerian question “resolved” and the 
nightmares of decolonisation and World War II placated with the benefits of the 
economic boom. It was in such seemingly comfortable circumstances that the space 
was created for the frustrations bubbling beneath the surface to come to the fore. 
Socially, France was changing at breakneck pace. Young people were making their 
presence felt; the working classes were being redefined; the immigrant population 
was growing; and morally, the ground was shifting. It was the encounter between 
the stultified, archaic Gaullist France and the ‘hungry for change’ society that 
explains why ’68 exploded in the way that it did. Early 1968 saw de Gaulle almost 
gloat at how the wave of protest sweeping the globe had passed France by.10 By May 
of the same year he was forced to eat his words, for, inspired by what was 
happening elsewhere, what started out as a small revolt by a handful of students 
brought the country to a standstill in a matter of weeks. Paradoxically, it is the 
stability and comfort that France found itself in that enabled the 1968 events to 
happen. This is certainly not how one would describe the social, economic and 
political predicament of 2016 France.  
 Still reeling from the fallout of the 2008-2010 financial crisis and political/ 
economic collateral damage that ensued, the heady days of les Trente Glorieuses were 
by 2016 but a distant memory. The unemployment rate had become normalised at 
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around 10%.11 Politically, the stability of de Gaulle’s stint as President could not have 
been more in contrast to the 2016 situation. François Hollande had taken over from 
the hugely unpopular and controversial Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012 only for himself to 
go and break the record for the most unpopular President in the history of the 5th 
Republic. The elections scheduled for 2017 appeared destined to confirm the rise of 
extremism to the detriment of the mainstream political elite. Finally, and crucially, 
France had fallen victim to a series of atrocious terrorist attacks which had only 
served to compound the sense of déclin that seemed to dominate the national psyche 
(Hazareesingh 2015, 287-305). The 2016 context was fundamentally different to that 
of 1968 and it can therefore not at all be that surprising that Nuit Debout did not see a 
repeat of the mai 68 events.  
 It is however, a change in how the public reacted to the actions of the police 
that most interests us here as an important consideration in explaining why Nuit 
Debout did not capture the imagination of the general public, despite seemingly 
having the ingredients to do so. Just as was the case in 1968, there was a heavy police 
presence during the Nuit Debout movement (Ngo and Troung, 15; 84; Farbiaz, 23-24). 
One must be careful to underscore the rather specific context that was the state of 
emergency that France found itself in at this stage. Following the Charlie Hebdo, then 
the November 2015 attacks in Paris, France was heavily securitised and this was the 
backdrop to how Nuit Debout would be policed. As well as maintaining a constant 
presence in and around Place de la République, and in particular enforcing the 
(increasingly limiting) curfew, the police – and most notably the CRS – made their 
presence felt during the numerous demonstrations that took place (Kokoreff, 168-70). 
A heavy police presence followed each Nuit Debout demonstration and more often 
than not resulted in clashes between the riot police and some elements of the 
movement. There was undoubtedly a heavy-hand in place that saw the use of quite 
repressive measures (tear-gas, batoning, flashballs, kettling, etc.) and the inevitable 
injuries that accompany such an approach.12 The omnipresence of the police and 
their repressive approach was the focus of much discussion and frustration within 
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the movement. In fact, participants flooded the various Nuit Debout outlets with 
material backing up their claims of police brutality.13 
 As outlined in the previous section, it was a similar level of police brutality in 
1968 that tipped France from a sectoral revolt into one that swept almost the entirety 
of society. It is argued that Nuit Debout shared many of the ingredients that help 
make sense of how 1968 emerged and unfolded. However, and crucially, somehow 
police heavy-handedness in 2016 did not bring about the same reaction as it did in 
1968 (all the more surprising given the depth of online material that backed-up 
rumours of brutality). This lies at the crux of what is argued in this piece. It could be 
assumed that the very specific and different context of 2016 France is all we need to 
take into consideration to explain how police brutality did not spark a similar 
spreading of the Nuit Debout movement. To a certain extent, this is true. However, 
and as will be argued in the following two sections, there is something else at stake. 
The reaction to the police handling of Nuit Debout is but evidence of a longer-term 
development of the reputation of the French police and how their actions are 
perceived by the general population. Furthermore, and almost paradoxically, May-
June 1968 – and in particular the dominant narrative on how the police behaved 
during these events – has not been without consequence in shaping contemporary 
attitudes to the French forces of order.  
 
The evolving reputation of the French police 
The stereotypical perception regarding the reputation of the police in France is 
hardly a positive one. It could be argued this is by no means exceptional, but some 
suggest that there are French specificities to be borne in mind. Berlière and Levy 
outline how the terminology used to describe the police over the years, their 
representation in cultural outputs and the general mockery of them all give a strong 
indication of the poor reputation of this institution. 
Des rapports difficiles, tendus, ambivalents…faits de peur, de répulsion, de haine, de 
fascination… le tout fondé sur des solides fantasmes et préjugés jamais simples, 
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jamais sains: voilà comment on pourrait caractériser les relations que les Français 
entretiennent avec leur police (457). 
 
This reputation is essential in understanding how it was that the police played such 
a critical role in the propagation of the 1968 events. The fact that – especially in the 
early stages – the primary response of the state was to send in the much-maligned 
forces of order only served to heighten tensions. The ensuing violence confirmed 
and exacerbated the already quite prominent anti-flic sentiment and subsequently 
increased public sympathy in opposition to what was perceived as police brutality. 
The images, accounts and rumours circulating on the nature of the police response 
were very much in keeping with what people had come to expect and therefore were 
inclined to believe. In some respects, the police fell victim to their reputation and as a 
result fanned the flames of frustration underpinning the 1968 events thus facilitating 
the spread of the revolt. A brief historical overview provides an insight into how 
such a negative reputation came to exist at this time.  
The period between the creation of the police in 1667 and the French 
Revolution would see the laying of the foundations of this poor reputation (Guitet-
Vauquelin 1928, 607-609). The definition of a broad reach of powers, coupled with 
the use of questionable methods in their mission to uphold the principles and protect 
the Ancien Régime, effectively pitted the police against the common people (Berlière 
and Levy, 23-25; Napoli 2003). This morally conservative, emergent institution, 
where religion carried a certain degree of influence, inevitably suffered greatly 
during the Revolutionary period, when any structural progress achieved was 
reversed and its poor reputation further consolidated. The silver-lining was that, 
henceforth, the role of the police would be to serve all the people (Milliot 2007, 172-
73). Napoleon’s influence in this domain would be significant, particularly through 
the creation of the Préfet de Police and the subsequent fragmentation of the 
organisational structures (Rigotard 1990). Efforts were also made during his time to 
introduce a tighter, centralised system through a program of reform and 
modernisation aimed at improving the police’s poor reputation. Such improvements 
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continued during the Third Republic with important innovations such as the 
creation of une école de police and increasing use of science (Berlière 2009). However, 
the societal discontent that would emerge in the early 20th century and the use of the 
police to violently repress the ensuing protests did little to improve the reputational 
damage the state was so keen to repair (Aubert 1979, 103-16).14 The experience of 
World War 2, when the police unquestionably found themselves in a very difficult 
predicament, would not help matters (Berlière and Chabrun 2001; Kitson 2002, 371-
90). Whilst some important changes, such as the creation of Les Gardes Mobiles in 
1941 (renamed Les Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS) in December 1944) were 
made during the Vichy era, it was the wholesale collaboration of this institution that 
would be most significant from a reputational perspective (Berlière and Levy, 30-32). 
Despite de Gaulle’s post-war efforts to achieve national unity via a degree of 
selective amnesia, the general population was not ready to forget what role the 
police had played (Kitson 1998, 637-38). Such delicate circumstances help explain 
why the police sought to distance itself from the politics of the Fourth Republic. 
However, the increased criminality and the mounting industrial tension of the time 
would see the, by then, increasingly common reflex of police repression and violence 
to break strikes and ensure law and order, with all the obvious consequences for 
their reputation (Berlière and Peschanski 2000; Vogel and Berlière 1997, 77). The 
decolonisation process and its collateral damage would not provide the context for 
any improvement and would be crucial in shaping perceptions on the eve of the 
1968 events.  
 It was, in particular, the Algerian war that would be the source of most 
problems, as opposition to French Algeria saw the state come under immense 
pressure and even become the target for terrorist attacks. As well as having to 
maintain law and order under such difficult circumstances, the police (as 
representatives of the state) themselves became legitimate targets for groups such as 
the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) (Blanchard 2006, 61-72; Berlière 2015, 523-41). 
Once again, they found themselves in a very difficult position that forced them to 
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turn against the state and even protest about their predicament (Blanchard 2011, 55-
73). This was just one (albeit very important) element in the demise of the IV 
Republic and the preparation of the ground for the return of General de Gaulle in 
1958. The latter’s return would see a certain leeway afforded the forces of order in 
terms of just how far repression could go and this was the context for yet more dark 
days, and in particular 17 October 1961 and the events of Charonne on 8 February 
1962 (Dewerpe 2006; Brunet 2003; Ross 2002, 41). In both instances, demonstrations 
opposing l’Algérie Française met with a violently repressive response by the police of 
Maurice Papon, resulting in multiple deaths. The sheer brutality of this response and 
the fact that it went unpunished shocked many and are crucial factors in 
understanding the heightened anti-flic attitude that would prove so vital just a few 
years later (Mathieu, 151; Hamon and Rotman 1987, 95-97).  
Whilst the subsequent police role in the kidnapping of Ben Barka in 1965 
marked the end of police involvement in the decolonisation process and the 1966 
Frey law ending the Préfecture de Paris opened up a new era, the violence of the early 
1960s had left a durable mark (Berlière and Levy, 318-19). As evidenced in the 
testimonies below, the police conduct of this time would be vitally important in the 
politicisation of the generation that would feature so prominently during the 1968 
events. For example, in a 2008 interview, Anne Querrien (member of the Mouvement 
du 22 mars in 1968) explicitly identified Charonne as pivotal in defining her political 
activism: 
Le tournant militant pour moi est situé en ’62. Il y a eu donc Charonne […] je 
trouvais qu’on étouffait pas des gens avec qui on était d’accord, et que donc ça 
suffisait comme ça. Le lendemain de Charonne j’ai adhéré au comité antifasciste du 
lycée (Querrien 2008). 
 
 In a 2007 interview, reflecting on the violence in and around his experiences of les 
années 68, Alain Geismar drew a direct line to police actions of the early 1960s: 
Tout ça faisait penser à ce qui s'était passé pendant la fin de la guerre d'Algérie, au 
moment des grandes manifestations du FLN où il y avait eu des Algériens jetés dans 
la Seine, l'époque où Papon était préfet de police. Pour nous il y avait une espèce de 
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continuité de la démarche policière là-dedans, donc on appelait à une manifestation 
dont on pensait qu'elle serait violente puisque c'était la police qui était mise en cause 
dans des meurtres (Gesimar 2007).  
 
On the eve of the 1968 events, whilst France was, for the first time in a very 
long time, at peace, new challenges were on the horizon for the state and its 
institutions. The police would once again have a pivotal role to play and, as the 
above historical overview highlights, would carry, particularly as a result of 
episodes such as Charonne, significant reputational baggage. It was in such a context 
that the events of 1968 exploded, thus explaining the high level of anti-police 
sentiment that would prove so critical in what happened.  
 
As outlined above, the Nuit Debout movement is indicative of just how far 
things have come in the period between 1968 and today. Police brutality, heavy-
handedness and violence were all very much in place in and around this important 
contemporary protest movement. However, and despite the prominence of this issue 
amongst participants and their efforts to publicise and expose such excesses, there 
was no repeat of 1968. The public revulsion with the police as a catalyst for the 
generalisation of the struggle was not there to the same extent in 2016. As if to 
underscore just how different things had become, there was even at one stage some 
contact between protesting police and the Nuit Debout movement itself (L-A 2016; 
Massemin 2016). Even more revelatory are the results of an opinion poll carried out 
on 16-17 June 2016 at the height of tensions concerning la Loi Travail entitled ‘La 
Police et les Français’.15 The overall impression was very positive. 86% of 
respondents declared that they have a positive image of the police. 43% said that 
police measures during the demonstrations against la Loi Travail were appropriate 
with only 21% considering the use of force excessive. There was also a ringing 
endorsement of the police with over three-quarters of respondents declaring their 
confidence in the ability of the police in maintaining security at the forthcoming 
Euro football tournament. A study by Catherine Gorgeon from 1994 highlights that 
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this level of positivity was not something entirely new but had been building for 
some time (245-273). She even goes as far as to argue that ‘L’ensemble des sondages le 
montre, l’image de la police est plutôt bonne dans l’opinion publique et de manière générale 
les Français font confiance aux différents responsables de la sécurité […]’ (247).  Such 
positivity regarding the police would have been unthinkable at the time of the 1968 
events. Just how can such a radical turnaround in fortunes be explained? 
It must first of all be noted that the results of the 2016 survey should not be 
taken as evidence that there are no longer any problems in terms of the reputation of 
the police in France. Problematic relations, often sparked by claims of police 
brutality, mishandling of demonstrations and continued tensions, have remained a 
staple feature of the landscape since 1968 (Belière and Levy, 496-509). For example, 
as recently as March 2017, there were demonstrations against police brutality related 
to suspicious, police-custody deaths (Pinault 2017). On the other hand, the police 
themselves continue to lament how they are portrayed and perceived, as was 
evidenced in the 18 May 2016 nationwide demonstrations against la haine anti-flic, 
organised by the police trade union Alliance Police Nationale16 and the December 
2016-January 2017 demonstrations in protest against attacks on police (Caillé and 
Gandini 2017). The context behind these opinion polls must also be borne in mind. 
The survey was carried out not just at the height of the protests against La Loi Travail 
but also against the backdrop of the terrorist attacks on France and the threat/ fear of 
more to come. In a perverse way, the police benefitted from these atrocities. The 
bravery of some officers, particularly those who lost their lives or were seriously 
injured were strongly appreciated by the general public, obviously enhancing the 
public’s impressions more generally (Miller 2015). Furthermore, the ongoing threat 
of more attacks would see an evident rapprochement as the public effectively relied 
on the (heavily enhanced) police presence to be able to go about their daily lives. 
However, whilst problems remain and today’s context is very specific, there are 
other factors at play that can enhance our understanding of the contemporary 
situation.  
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Memories of May ’68 and the rehabilitation of the police 
Since 1968, significant changes, developments and reforms have been put in place 
that have impacted on just how the police are currently perceived (Monjardet 1996, 
230-70). As Mathieu details, there was a strong desire from within the institution to 
learn the lessons of the experience of the 1968 events. As a result, in the immediate 
aftermath, rapid, effective action was taken in terms of organisation, equipment and 
use of intelligence to address the problems exposed (166-170). The events of 1968 
were immediately followed by what has become known as the système Marcellin, 
named after the new Interior Minister (Sarazin 1974; Artières and Zanarini-Fournel 
2008, 578-79). The Minister believed a heavy-hand was required in order to suppress 
the extremist, left-wing and irresponsible tendencies that, in his view, had brought 
France to the brink in May-June 1968. This repressive approach dominated the post-
68 period. On the positive side this meant a huge surge in investment in the police 
with a marked increase in financial support and recruitment. From a tactical and 
material point of view, lessons were learned during the events and more training 
was instituted in order to ensure that these lessons were put into practice in the now 
obsessive drive to maintain order (Liaisons 2008, 101-106). It could therefore be 
argued that the events forced immediate changes that would help the police carry 
out their missions more effectively. Therefore, despite the subsequent heavy-
handedness, the role of the police in 1968 was largely seen as positive. Such an 
interpretation was in evidence in a 2008 documentary on the 1968 events that 
contained a section on the role of the police.17 It’s title, ‘CRS, Stars de 68’, and its 
overall sympathetic analysis of the police, speak volumes about the increasingly 
positive perspective focussed on the forces of order in 1968 narratives. In addition, 
this particular section concludes thus on how the events were indeed a positive 
moment for this institution: Si la Révolution des étudiants n’a pas abouti, celle des 
professionnelles du maintien de l’ordre a bien eu lieu.18 
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However, this focus on maintaining order in the face of a political threat 
meant that France somewhat took its eye off the ball in terms of new developments 
in criminality taking root during the 1970s. Drug trafficking, bank robberies, and 
international gangs characterised this shift, eventually forcing Marcellin out and 
triggering a much overdue reconfiguration of what mattered in terms of modern day 
policing. This reflective period came to a head with the arrival of the Left to power in 
1981 and signalled the next period of sustained change and development (Artières 
and Zancarini-Fournel, 580-81). Mitterrand’s historic victory would inevitably see a 
focus on making significant changes to an institution that historically was not 
considered positively by the Left (Body-Gendrot and Duprez 2001, 377-402). Many 
changes were introduced aimed at reconciling the police with the general 
population. The desire to bring the French police up to the required standards would 
see an emphasis on training, modernisation, science and intelligence. The need for 
improvement was increased by the onset of terrorism, tensions over immigration as 
well as the widening optic of Europeanisation and globalisation during the 1980s. 
The issue of security soon emerged as a central political question and the desire for a 
rapprochement in order to respond to the desire for greater security lead to the 
notion of police de proximité (Monjardet 1999). As the alternance of the 1990s and 2000s 
set in, the issue of security only seemed to gain greater prominence (Mucchielli 
2008). As a result, the police would once again find itself front and centre in the 
difficult position that history has forced them to become accustomed to (Mouhanna 
2011).  
Mounting concerns over domestic and international terrorism and the 
enduring threat of street politics have meant that it would be inaccurate to suggest 
that the challenges facing the police today are in some ways less significant than was 
the case in 1968 or even beforehand. In fact, particularly noteworthy in this respect 
were the banlieue disturbances of 2005 (c.f. for example, Moran 2012; le Goaziou and 
Mucchielli 2006). Following the death of two teenagers, electrocuted as they fled the 
police, a sustained period of violence saw the conduct of the forces of order once 
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again put under the microscope with their reputation, particularly amongst young 
people, considerably damaged. Just as had been the case prior to 1968 with the 
episodes of 17 October 1961 and Charonne, the events of 2005 must be borne in mind 
when contextualising and making sense of recent attitudes to the police. Whilst such 
a similarity could perhaps lend extra weight to the comparisons between 1968 and 
2016, the fact that (despite the reputational damage caused by the 2005 riots and 
other ongoing tensions) the anti-flic sentiment was so less potent during the Nuit 
Debout protests only goes to further consolidate the argument that times have indeed 
changed.  
Taking the long-term view then, and very much in keeping with 
developments elsewhere as a result of this period of protest, 1968 unquestionably 
signalled a watershed moment that led to considerable and durable improvements 
across the board for the French police (Jobard 2008, 577-583; della Porta, Peter and 
Reiter 2006, 3-4; Fillieule 1997, 243-304). Bruneteaux’s detailed analysis of the ‘grand 
mouvement de réformes’ (197-244) as a result of 1968 underscores the extent to which 
the 1968 events should be considered as an important, and positive, turning point for 
this institution: ‘Mai 1968 inaugure une phase de sophistication qui oriente la gendarmerie 
mobile et les CRS vers une formation permanente aux techniques de contrôle de soi’ (27).  
Short term and durable improvements have clearly been made in terms of reform 
and investment and valuable lessons were taken on board as a result of the 1968 
events leading to a significant change in how the police have been organised, 
financed and supported. However, this is not the only reason why 1968 should be 
considered as a positive moment for the police in France.   
 
Over the course of the past five decades, a certain dominant narrative of the 
1968 events has become anchored in the French collective memory. This ‘convenient 
consensus’ is characterised by a number of traits that have ultimately led to a very 
limited perspective monopolising popular perceptions of these seminal events 
(Reynolds 2011). Briefly, the over-emphasis on radical, Paris-based students during 
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the more spectacular moments of May 1968 has essentially minimised the 
importance of what happened and what potential it had. Central to this doxa is the 
portrayal of the role played by the forces of order that has come to dominate over the 
years. Whilst there is, broadly speaking, a general consensus surrounding the 
centrality of the role played by the police in ensuring the spread of the 1968 revolt, 
just how this role has been interpreted over the years has undergone some 
interesting changes (Mathieu 2013, 145; Reynolds 2011, 47-8; 128-29). This became 
particularly evident in and around the time of the 40th anniversary of the events that 
in many respects can be viewed as the culmination of a process that has seen the role 
of the police forces in 1968 being considered more positively (cf. for example 
Collectif 2008; Grimaud 2007).19 This ‘pacification mémorielle’ (Mathieu, 146) has been 
strikingly apparent through the case of Maurice Grimaud. The ‘mythologizing’ of 
the then Préfet de Police had by 2008 seen him acquire the position of hero of the 1968 
events in France (Ross, 48). From an early stage, Grimaud was held up as the 
epitome of common sense, someone who understood what was happening and 
responsible for ensuring that the police avoided any excesses, despite great 
provocation. This positive spin of the early days has progressively become anchored 
in the dominant narrative of the events. Grimaud’s peaceful approach has come to 
represent what was overall a very measured and professional approach by the police 
whose sang-froid ensured that “no-one died”.20 As if to exemplify the extent to which 
the positive narrative on the police focussed around the actions and approach of 
Grimaud has become anchored in the way the 1968 events are remembered, let us 
again turn to Nuit Debout.  
Of all the measures carried out by Grimaud, his famous letter to his troops 
calling for cool heads on 29 May is that most frequently referred to and seen to 
typify his exemplary approach.21 When in 2016, the police held their march against 
‘la haine anti-flic’, one of the responses of Nuit Debout activists was to distribute to the 
police copies of Grimaud’s famous letter from 1968. Back then, the anti-flic sentiment 
was writ large in posters, slogans, cries of CRS-SS and even “Grimaud assassin”. By 
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2016, protestors’ narratives had moved on considerably, reflecting just how 
perceptions have changed and how perspectives on the 1968 events have moved 
away from the anti-police sentiments of the time to something much more positive. 
Such a sympathetic interpretation is often linked to the suggestion that the police 
found themselves in an unenviable situation and that under such circumstances did 
an admirable job. The upshot of this is that we have moved on considerably from the 
anti-flic sentiment that was so important during the 1968 events. Back then, it was 
revulsion at how the police handled themselves that swelled public support, 
triggered the greatest strike in French history and brought France to the brink of a 
political crisis. However, the construction of an altogether different narrative that 
presents the police as no longer the villains but in fact the heroes of 1968 has helped 
shape a completely different perspective, and one whose impact has affected 
understandings of 1968 specifically but also cannot have been without significance 
for the general reputation of the French police, as evidenced below. 
 
During the period 2002-2003, a survey was carried out amongst French 
University students with the aim of ascertaining a general sense of how the events of 
May-June 1968 were perceived and understood by young French people.22 There was 
a particular focus on taking stock of the extent to which the, by then firmly 
established, dominant narrative had shaped or inflected such impressions. The 
survey covered a wide range of issues, one of which focussed on understandings of 
the role played by the police and the impact of these events on how they are publicly 
viewed in France.23 When asked to reflect on how certain sectors were impacted by 
the 1968 events, a strong percentage (37.6%) of respondents agreed that the police 
were indeed implicated and affected. Respondents were also asked their opinion on 
the extent to which they felt the behaviour and attitude of the police in 1968 had 
changed how they were perceived in France. A majority of respondents (42.2%) were 
in agreement that 1968 had indeed shaped such perceptions. The combination of an 
awareness of the important role played by the police in 1968 and a recognition that 
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such an involvement had been important in shaping public attitudes towards this 
institution begs the question of just how this role should be understood.  
Table 1 
Les phrases suivantes décrivent bien l’attitude de la 
police pendant les événements de mai 1968 
FED ED N EA FEA24 
Scandaleuse 3 14.1 38.8 29.7 9.9 
La Police a été provoquée 5 15 35.6 36.2 4.2 
Opportuniste 3.6 14.3 57 18.2 1 
Fasciste 13.7 26.1 41.6 12.3 1 
Pas assez dure 21.6 33.5 35 2.6 1.2 
La police faisait simplement son travail 4.8 19.2 34.7 29.7 6.3 
 
As Table 1 demonstrates, perceptions of the police approach in 1968 have certainly 
come a long way. Of the possible negative assessments, despite a strong percentage 
agreeing that their behaviour was scandalous, only small numbers were in 
agreement with the idea that their behaviour should be understood as fascistic or 
opportunist. It is in fact the strong percentages on positive assessments that are most 
striking. Over 40% agreed that he police had been provoked and over 35% agreed 
that they were simply doing their job. Aligned with the overwhelming majority that 
rejected the belief that the Police were not hard enough, it would be a reasonable 
assessment that the overriding impression amongst respondents was one that fitted 
with dominant, and largely positive, narrative of the how the police conducted itself 
in 1968. 
The results of this survey, conducted some 35 years after the 1968 events 
reveal much about how the dominant narrative on mai 68 has shaped perceptions. 
Specifically regarding the debate on police conduct, it is clear that a recognition of 
the importance of their role is in place as well as an understanding that these events 
have been important in shaping public perceptions. The generally positive 
perspective amongst respondents concerning how the role played by the police 
should be understood as evidence of how the dominant narrative had taken effect 
amongst younger people’s perceptions and understandings. Instead of the anti-flic 
sentiment, so prominent in ensuring the spread of the events back in 1968, growing 
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consensus has formed around a much more positive reading. The idea that the 
police, forced to take the lead in a very difficult set of circumstances, should be 
credited and not criticised for an excellent job carried out in a firm but fair manner 
has taken root. As mentioned previously, by the time of the 40th anniversary, such an 
assessment was further consolidated and one can foresee the continuation of this 
trend during the 2018 commemoration period.  
 
Conclusion 
One must be careful not to overplay the idea that the French forces of order have 
been completely rehabilitated in the eyes of the population – this is quite simply not 
the case. Many problems continue to surface on a regular basis and the French police 
still have some way to go before one can genuinely talk of a reversal of the 
reputational damage that has been forged through its long, complex and difficult 
history. Furthermore, in a nation with ongoing social tensions, the threat of terrorism 
and where protest is part and parcel of how things actually function, it is clear that 
the police will continue to find itself caught in difficult predicaments, such as was 
the case during Nuit Debout, where the anti-flic sentiment raises its head. However, 
and as argued above, the same movement demonstrated how times have changed. 
The striking similarities between 1968 and Nuit Debout left many to ask whether or 
not France stood on the brink of another mai 68. The level of police brutality was 
unquestionably one of the stand-out, shared characteristics and therefore convinced 
many that this movement, like the May events, could catch fire and spread across 
society. That this did not happen, it has been argued, is partly due to shifting 
perspectives regarding the place, the reputation and the behaviour of the police. The 
stark differences in context should not be forgotten but in addition to that one must 
look to 1968 as a crucial moment that has helped reduce the anti-flic sentiment that 
had been so pivotal during the events. Firstly, mai 68 forced the authorities to 
reconsider how the police were organised, trained and supported. This has led to 
obvious improvements over the years that cannot have been without significance on 
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how the police have performed and are thus perceived. In addition, the manner in 
which the dominant narrative surrounding mai 68 has been constructed and forged 
over the years has seen the police pass from being the pariah of the barricades to the 
heroes of the peace. The events of 1968 that so emphatically demonstrated the 
existence and potency of an anti-flic sentiment within French society paradoxically 
triggered the beginning of a process that would help strongly rehabilitate the poor 
reputation they had suffered from for so long. There will be no repeat of the 1968 
events in France and there are many reasons to explain why. One of the most 
significant of those reasons is the fundamentally different attitude the public has 
regarding the forces of order in France and, ironically, the 1968 events have been 
part of bringing about this positive change.  
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